Evaluating the occurrence and disappearance of real options by Nishihara, Michi
 
 
 
Discussion Papers In Economics 
And Business 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graduate School of Economics and 
Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP) 
Osaka University, Toyonaka, Osaka 560-0043, JAPAN
 
Evaluating the occurrence and disappearance of real 
options 
 
Michi NISHIHARA 
 
 
Discussion Paper 10-19 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
July 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graduate School of Economics and 
Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP) 
Osaka University, Toyonaka, Osaka 560-0043, JAPAN 
 
Evaluating the occurrence and disappearance of real 
options 
 
Michi NISHIHARA 
 
 
Discussion Paper 10-19 
 
Evaluating the occurrence and disappearance of real
options¤
Michi NISHIHARAy
Abstract
This paper investigates the decision-making of a ¯rm that has an option to invest
in a single project among multiple alternatives. This type of option is called a max-
option, and the nature of a max-option has been investigated in several papers. I extend
the previous analysis to a model that allows the random occurrence and disappearance of
alternative projects in which to invest. The occurrence and disappearance of opportunities
in which to invest will be caused by changes in regulation, the exit and entry of rival ¯rms,
technological innovation, political risk, catastrophes, etc. For example, the model applies
to land development with an alternative land use choice under uncertainty about changes
in zoning and development regulations. I show the properties of the exercise region and
the value function for the option. Speci¯cally, I demonstrate that the prospective future
occurrence of an alternative has the signi¯cant e®ect of increasing the option value and
deferring the investment decision.
JEL Classi¯cations Code: C61, G13, G31.
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1 Introduction
The real options approach, in which option pricing theory is applied to capital budget-
ing decisions, better enables us to ¯nd the optimal investment strategy and undertake
project valuation under uncertainty than is possible under more classical methods. The
early literature has investigated a real option that has a rather simple payo® structure,
assuming that the dynamics of project value follow a one-dimensional stochastic process
(see (Dixit and Pindyck 1994)). Naturally, the studies have developed into a more compli-
cated analysis on the basis of a multidimensional process (e.g., (Geltner, Riddiough, and
Stojanovic 1996, Louberg¶e, Villeneuve, and Chesney 2002, Martzoukos 2009, Bastian-
Pinto, Brand~ao, and Alves 2010, Nishihara 2010)). For example, (Geltner, Riddiough,
and Stojanovic 1996) investigates land development timing with an alternative land use
choice. In (Geltner, Riddiough, and Stojanovic 1996), the option's payo® depends on the
maximum of several underlying asset prices. This type of option is called a max-option,
which has been also investigated in (Stulz 1982, Johnson 1987, Broadie and Detemple
1997, Villeneuve 1999, Detemple 2006).1
This paper extends the previous max-option literature to a model that allows the
Poisson arrival or death of an alternative project in which to invest. The uncertain
occurrence or disappearance of the investment opportunity will be caused by changes
in regulation, the exit and entry of rival ¯rms2, technological innovation, political risk,
catastrophes, etc. The model captures these risks in addition to uncertainty about the
future market values of projects. For example, the model applies to land development with
an alternative land use choice under uncertainty about changes in zoning and development
regulations. Especially in an emerging country, regulatory and political changes frequently
happen, and hence, a ¯rm is required to evaluate the option value and optimize the
investment strategy taking account of these risks.
Conventionally, numerous studies on ¯nancial derivatives have modeled the catas-
trophic risks as a stock price following a discontinuous stochastic process with jumps.
Most of the real options studies have followed this convention. For example, (Martzoukos
and Trigeorgis 2002) investigates both a growth option and an extension option involving
various types of rare events, assuming the underlying asset value follows a jump di®usion
process. (Boyarchenko 2004) presents the option values and the optimal investment strate-
gies for both one-shot investment with ¯xed costs and incremental capacity expansion,
assuming the underlying asset value follows a geometric L¶evy process.
A distinction between this paper and the previous works is that this paper directly
models the possibility that an opportunity in which to invest occurs or disappears. This
1(Nishihara 2010) reveals the nature of a combination of a max-option and a spread option.
2An alternative approach is the game-theoretic approach. Strategic interactions among several ¯rms are
investigated in (Grenadier 1996, Grenadier 2002, Weeds 2002, Lambrecht and Perraudin 2003) among others.
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direct approach can provide a simpler and more appropriate valuation of the real options
than the previous approach. The model directly captures the e®ects of the uncertain
disappearance or occurrence of an alternative. To my knowledge, this is the ¯rst paper that
reveals the interactions among the random disappearance or occurrence of an alternative
project, investment timing, and project choice. Technically, this study links the standard
option to the max-option via the Poisson arrival or death. In other words, I investigate
an option that may change to the max-option by the Poisson arrival and a max-option
that may change to the standard option by the Poisson death.
In the model, I reveal how the possibility of the occurrence or disappearance in°uences
the optimal exercise policy and the option value. Naturally, a higher intensity of the
occurrence (disappearance) plays the role in increasing (decreasing) the value of the option
to defer the investment timing and discouraging (encouraging) investment. In addition,
the properties, such as the monotonicity and convexity shown by the max-option literature
(e.g., (Geltner, Riddiough, and Stojanovic 1996, Broadie and Detemple 1997, Detemple
2006)), hold true even if the occurrence or disappearance of the alternative are taken into
consideration. The result ensures the robustness of these properties.
Furthermore, the numerical analysis reveals the following characteristics. The possi-
bility of uncertain changes in°uences the option value and the optimal investment policy
for the option that may change to the max-option greater than the max-option that may
change to the standard option. Indeed, for the rational parameter values, the prospec-
tive future occurrence of an alternative has the potential to enhance the option value by
almost 50%. The e®ect becomes larger, especially for a weaker or negative correlation
between the project values, because a weaker or negative correlation increases the value
of the max-option that may appear in future.
This paper also entails real-world implications. For example, the results o®er rational
explanations for the behavior of an owner of farmland which has not been cultivated in
many years. Recently, an increase in idled farmland has been a serious issue in Japan.
Typically, idled farmland is restricted within the agricultural use because the zoning
and development ordinances prohibit nonagricultural uses. However, prospective future
regulatory and environmental changes may enable an owner to develop land for residential
or commercial uses. That is, an owner of idled farmland has the option that may change
to the max-option. In addition to the relatively high value of residential or commercial
land, the weak correlation between the alternative use and the agricultural use increases
the option value and deters an owner from cultivating farmland.
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2 Preliminaries
Consider a ¯rm that has an option to invest in a project. There are two exclusive projects
i = 1 and 2. The risk-adjusted values of the projects, X(t) = (X1(t); X2(t)), are random
and follow GBMs (Geometric Brownian Motion)
dXi(t) = ¹iXi(t)dt+ ¾iXi(t)dBi(t); (1)
where B1(t); B2(t) are Brownian Motions (BM) with correlation coe±cient ½ satisfying
j½j < 1. Constants ¹i and ¾i(> 0) denote the risk-adjusted growth rate and volatility
of the project value, respectively. Investing in project i requires an irreversible capital
expenditure of Ii(> 0). Mathematically, the model is built on the ¯ltered probability
space (­;F ; P ;Ft) generated by (B1(t); B2(t)). The set Ft represents the set of available
information at time t, and the ¯rm optimizes the investment policy under this information.
The risk-free rate is a constant r(> 0). For convergence, I assume that r > ¹.3 The
maturity of the options is T (> 0).
2.1 Standard option
As a benchmark, I consider a ¯rm that has an option to invest in a given project i. A
¯rm cannot invest in project j( 6= i). For Xi(t) = xi, the option value is equal to the value
function of the optimal stopping problem as follows:4
Vi(xi; t) := sup
¿2Tt
Exit [1f¿·Tge
¡r(¿¡t)(Xi(¿)¡ Ii)]; (2)
where Tt denotes the set of all stopping times ¿ ¸ t and Exit [¢] denotes the expectation
conditional on Xi(t) = xi. The subscript i denotes the option to invest in project i.
Note that problem (2) is analogous to an American call option written on a stock with a
dividend. The optimal stopping time for problem (2) becomes ¿i(t) := inffs ¸ t j X(s) 2
Sii(s)g, where the stopping region Sii(s) is de¯ned by
Sii(s) := fx 2 R2++ j Vi(xi; s) = xi ¡ Iig: (3)
The superscript i means the immediate exercise region for project i. The optimal policy
is that a ¯rm makes investment in project i as soon as X(s) hits Sii(s). The following
properties are well known (e.g., (Detemple 2006)):
(Convexity of the value function) Vi(xi; t) is convex with respect to xi.
(Monotonicity of the stopping region) x 2 Sii(t)) x0 2 Sii(t) (8x0i ¸ xi;8x0j 2 R++),
where i 6= j.
3Refer to (Dixit and Pindyck 1994) for the economic rationale for this assumption.
4When the maturity is in¯nite, I have only to replace 1f¿·Tg with 1f¿<1g.
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The monotonicity implies that Sii(t) can be expressed as S
i
i(t) = fx 2 R2++ j xi ¸ x¤i (t)g,
where x¤i (t) denotes the threshold. This type of optimal policy is called the threshold
policy.
Next, consider a case in which the investment opportunity for project i is killed at an
instantaneous rate ¸dt, where a positive constant ¸ denotes the intensity of the Poisson
death. I assume that the disappearance is independent of X(t). The disappearance of
an opportunity in which to invest will be caused by the enforcement of new regulations,
preemption by rival ¯rms, political changes, natural disasters, etc. For Xi(t) = xi, the
option value prior to the death is equal to the value function of the optimal stopping
problem as follows:
Vi!;(xi; t) := sup
¿2Tt
Exit [
Z 1
0
1f¿·Tg1f¿<t+yge¡r(¿¡t)(Xi(¿)¡ Ii)¸e¡¸ydy]; (4)
where the subscript i! ; means that project i may be killed. I have
Exit [
Z 1
0
1f¿·Tg1f¿<t+yge¡r(¿¡t)(Xi(¿)¡ Ii)¸e¡¸ydy]
= Exit [1f¿·Tge
¡r(¿¡t)(Xi(¿)¡ Ii)
Z 1
¿¡t
¸e¡¸ydy]
= Exit [1f¿·Tge
¡(r+¸)(¿¡t)(Xi(¿)¡ Ii)
Z 1
0
¸e¡¸ydy]
= Exit [1f¿·Tge
¡(r+¸)(¿¡t)(Xi(¿)¡ Ii)]: (5)
Then, problem (4) can be rewritten as follows:
Vi!;(xi; t) = sup
¿2Tt
Exit [1f¿·Tge
¡(r+¸)(¿¡t)(Xi(¿)¡ Ii)]: (6)
That is, the problem with the random disappearance is equivalent to the standard problem
(2) with the augmented discount rate r + ¸. This has also been shown in (Weeds 2002).
Then, problem (6) satis¯es the same properties, such as the convexity of the value function
and the monotonicity of the stopping region, as problem (2). Until the death the option
value follows the continuous process Vi!;(Xi(t); t), and it jumps downward to zero at the
random death. In addition, because of Vi!;(xi; t) · Vi(xi; t), the stopping region Sii!;(t)
for problem (6) is larger than Sii(t). Note that Vi!;(xi; t) # maxfxi ¡ Ii; 0g; Sii!;(t) "
fx 2 R2++ j xi > Iig (¸ " 1) and Vi!;(xi; t) " Vi(xi; t); Sii!;(t) # Sii(t) (¸ # 0).
Now, consider a case in which the investment opportunity for project i occurs at an
instantaneous rate ¸dt, where a positive constant ¸ denotes the intensity of the Poisson
arrival. I assume that the occurrence is independent of X(t). The occurrence of an
opportunity in which to invest will be caused by deregulation, the exit of rival ¯rms,
technological innovation, etc. For Xi(t) = xi, the option value prior to its arrival is equal
to the following expectation:
V;!i(xi; t) := Exit [
Z 1
0
e¡ryVi(Xi(t+ y); t+ y)¸e¡¸ydy]; (7)
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where the subscript ; ! imeans that project imay be available in future. A ¯rm waits for
the arrival of the option, and after the arrival it adopts the optimal policy for problem (2).
At the time of arrival, the option value jumps upward from V;!i(Xi(t); t) to Vi(Xi(t); t).
Note that V;!i(xi; t) " Vi(xi; t) (¸ " 1) and V;!i(xi; t) # 0 (¸ # 0).
2.2 Max-option
As a benchmark, this subsection considers an option to invest in a single project between
projects 1 and 2. The model applies not only to a case in which two projects are ex-
clusive (e.g., alternative land use in (Geltner, Riddiough, and Stojanovic 1996)) but also
to a case where a ¯rm faces a budget constraint. This type of option is identi¯ed as an
American max-option. European max-options have been studied in (Stulz 1982, Johnson
1987), while American max-options have been studied in (Geltner, Riddiough, and Sto-
janovic 1996, Broadie and Detemple 1997, Villeneuve 1999, Detemple 2006). Although a
typical max-option has a multidimensional state variable, (D¶ecamps, Mariotti, and Vil-
leneuve 2006) studies a max-option based on a one-dimensional state variable in order to
investigate investment timing with an alternative scale choice.
For X(t) = x, the option value is equal to the value function of the optimal stopping
problem as follows:
V1;2(x; t) := sup
¿2Tt
Ext [1f¿·Tge¡r(¿¡t)max
i=1;2
fXi(¿)¡ Iig| {z }
project choice
]; (8)
where the subscript 1; 2 represents the option to invest between projects 1 and 2.
The optimal stopping time for problem (2) becomes ¿1;2(t) := inffs ¸ t j X(s) 2
S1;2(s) = S11;2(s) [ S21;2(s)g, where the stopping region Si1;2(s) is de¯ned by
Si1;2(s) := fx 2 R2++ j V1;2(x; s) = xi ¡ Iig (9)
for i = 1 and 2. The max-option literature (e.g., (Geltner, Riddiough, and Stojanovic
1996, Broadie and Detemple 1997)) shows the following properties:
(Convexity of the value function) V1;2(x; t) is convex with respect to x.
(Convexity of each stopping region) Si1;2(t) is a convex set.
(Monotonicity of each stopping region) x 2 Si1;2(t)) x0 2 Si1;2(t) (8x0i ¸ xi;8x0j ·
xj), where i 6= j.
(Behavior on the indi®erence line) x1 ¡ I1 = x2 ¡ I2 ) x =2 S1;2(t).
The monotonicity of Si1;2(t) implies that an increase (decrease) in the value of project i
(j 6= i) facilitates investment in project i. The behavior on the indi®erence line means
that a ¯rm waits and sees which project is better when the values of two projects equal.
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3 Main Results
This section links the standard option in Section 2.1 and the max-option in Section 2.2
via a random variable distributed exponentially. Section 3.1 investigates a max-option
that may change to the standard option, while Section 3.2 investigates an option that
may change to the max-option. I show several properties of the option values and exercise
regions. The model applies to the decision-making process about land development with
an alternative land use choice under regulatory risks.
3.1 Max-option that will change to the standard option
As in Section 2.2, consider an option to invest between projects 1 and 2. Assume that
the investment opportunity for project 2 is killed at an instantaneous rate ¸dt which is
independent of X(t).5 For X(t) = x, the option value is equal to the value function of
the optimal stopping problem as follows:6
V1;2!1(x; t) := sup
¿2Tt
Ext [
Z 1
0
1f¿·Tgf1f¿<t+yge¡r(¿¡t)max
i=1;2
fXi(¿)¡ Iig
+1f¿¸t+yge¡ryV1(X1(t+ y); t+ y)g¸e¡¸ydy]; (10)
where y denotes the term until the death. The subscript 1; 2 ! 1 represents the max-
option that may change to the standard option to invest in project 1.
Using the similar calculation to (5), I can rewrite problem (10) as
V1;2!1(x; t) = sup
¿2Tt
Ext [1f¿·Tge¡(r+¸)(¿¡t)max
i=1;2
fXi(¿)¡ Ii¡V;!1(X1(¿); ¿)g]+V;!1(x1; t);
(11)
where V;!1(x1; t) is de¯ned by (7). The optimal stopping time for problem (11) becomes
¿1;2!1(t) := inffs ¸ t j X(s) 2 S1;2!1(s) = S11;2!1(s) [ S21;2!1(s)g, where the stopping
region Si1;2!1(s) is de¯ned by
Si1;2!1(s) := fx 2 R2++ j V1;2!1(x; s) = xi ¡ Iig (12)
for i = 1 and 2.
Proposition 1
(Convexity of the value function) V1;2!1(x; t) is convex with respect to x.
(Convexity of each stopping region) Si1;2!1(t) is a convex set.
(Monotonicity of each stopping region) x 2 Si1;2!1(t) ) x0 2 Si1;2!1(t) (8x0i ¸
xi;8x0j · xj), where i 6= j.
5(Nishihara 2009) models rival preemption for the max-option endogenously. Indeed, (Nishihara 2009) derives
the equilibrium of a preemption game in which two ¯rms compete for two alternatives.
6This problem is the same as the max-option problem (8) replaced X2(t) with the killed process.
6
(Behavior on the indi®erence line) x1 ¡ I1 = x2 ¡ I2 ) x =2 S1;2!1(t).
(Comparison) maxfV1(x1; t); V2!;(x2; t)g · V1;2!1(x; t) · V1;2(x; t), S11;2(t) ½ S11;2!1(t) ½
S11(t), and S
2
1;2(t) ½ S21;2!1(t) ½ S22!;(t).
Proof
(Convexity of the value function) For any x; x0 2 R++ and ® 2 [0; 1], I have
V1;2!1(®x+ (1¡ ®)x0; t)
= sup
¿2Tt
E(1;1)t [
Z 1
0
1f¿·Tgf1f¿<t+yge¡r(¿¡t)max
i=1;2
f(®xi + (1¡ ®)x0i)Xi(¿)¡ Iig
+1f¿¸t+yge¡ryV1((®x1 + (1¡ ®)x01)X1(t+ y); t+ y)g¸e¡¸ydy]
· sup
¿2Tt
E(1;1)t [
Z 1
0
1f¿·Tgf1f¿<t+yge¡r(¿¡t)(®max
i=1;2
fxiXi(¿)¡ Iig+ (1¡ ®)max
i=1;2
fx0iXi(¿)¡ Iig)
+1f¿¸t+yge¡ry(®V1(x1X1(t+ y); t+ y) + (1¡ ®)V1(x01X1(t+ y); t+ y))g¸e¡¸ydy] (13)
· ® sup
¿2Tt
E(1;1)t [
Z 1
0
1f¿·Tgf1f¿<t+yge¡r(¿¡t)max
i=1;2
fxiXi(¿)¡ Iig
+1f¿¸t+yge¡ryV1(x1X1(t+ y); t+ y)g¸e¡¸ydy]
+(1¡ ®) sup
¿2Tt
E(1;1)t [
Z 1
0
1f¿·Tgf1f¿<t+yge¡r(¿¡t)max
i=1;2
fx0iXi(¿)¡ Iig
+1f¿¸t+yge¡ryV1(x01X1(t+ y); t+ y)g¸e¡¸ydy]
= ®V1;2!1(x; t) + (1¡ ®)V1;2!1(x0; t);
where (13) results from the convexity of V1(x; t) and maxi=1;2fxi ¡ Iig.
(Convexity of each stopping region) For any x; x0 2 Si1;2!1(t) and ® 2 [0; 1], I have
V1;2!1(®x+ (1¡ ®)x0; t) · ®V1;2!1(x; t) + (1¡ ®)V1;2!1(x0; t) (14)
= ®(xi ¡ Ii) + (1¡ ®)(x0i ¡ Ii)
= ®xi + (1¡ ®)x0i ¡ Ii;
where (14) results from the convexity of V1;2!1(x; t), and the last inequality implies ®x+
(1¡ ®)x0 2 Si1;2!1(t).
(Monotonicity of each stopping region) It follows from the convexity of V1(x1; t)
with respect to x and @V1(x1; t)=@x1 = 1 for x1 > x¤1(t) that
V1(x01; t) · V1(x1; t) + x01 ¡ x1 (x01 ¸ x1) (15)
7
Take any x 2 S11;2!1(t) and x0 satisfying x01 ¸ x1 and x02 · x2. I have
V1;2!1(x0; t)
= sup
¿2Tt
E(1;1)t [
Z 1
0
1f¿·Tgf1f¿<t+yge¡r(¿¡t)max
i=1;2
fx0iXi(¿)¡ Iig
+1f¿¸t+yge¡ryV1(x01X1(t+ y); t+ y)g¸e¡¸ydy]
· sup
¿2Tt
E(1;1)t [
Z 1
0
1f¿·Tgf1f¿<t+yge¡r(¿¡t)(max
i=1;2
fxiXi(¿)¡ Iig+ (x01 ¡ x1)X1(¿))
+1f¿¸t+yge¡ry(V1(x1X1(t+ y); t+ y) + (x01 ¡ x1)X1(t+ y))g¸e¡¸ydy] (16)
· sup
¿2Tt
E(1;1)t [
Z 1
0
1f¿·Tgf1f¿<t+yge¡r(¿¡t)max
i=1;2
fxiXi(¿)¡ Iig
+1f¿¸t+yge¡ry(V1(x1X1(t+ y); t+ y)g¸e¡¸ydy]
+ sup
¿2Tt
E1t [
Z 1
0
1f¿·Tgf1f¿<t+yge¡r(¿¡t)(x01 ¡ x1)X1(¿)
+1f¿¸t+yge¡ry(x01 ¡ x1)X1(t+ y)g¸e¡¸ydy]
· V1;2!1(x; t) + sup
¿2Tt
E1t [1f¿·Tge¡r(¿¡t)(x01 ¡ x1)X1(¿)]
= x1 ¡ I1 + x01 ¡ x1
= x01 ¡ I1; (17)
where (16) follows from (15). The last inequality (17) implies x0 2 S11;2!1(t), and hence,
I have the monotonicity of S11;2!1(t). Similarly, I can show the monotonicity of S21;2!1(t).
(Behavior on the indi®erence line) Take any x satisfying x1 ¡ I1 = x2 ¡ I2. First,
note that
V1;2!;(x; t) := sup
¿2Tt
Ext [
Z 1
0
1f¿·Tgf1f¿<t+yge¡r(¿¡t)max
i=1;2
fXi(¿)¡ Iig¸e¡¸ydy]
= sup
¿2Tt
Ext [1f¿·Tge¡(r+¸)(¿¡t)max
i=1;2
fXi(¿)¡ Iig] (18)
> x1 ¡ I1; (19)
where I can show (18) by the similar calculation to (5). The last inequality (19) follows
from the behavior on the indi®erence line for the max-option in Section 2.2. Then, I have
V1;2!1(x; t) ¸ V1;2!;(x; t)
> x1 ¡ I1;
where the last inequality implies that x =2 S11;2!1(t). Similarly, I have x =2 S21;2!1(t).
(Comparison) The inequalities with respect to the value functions are clear. For any
x 2 Si1;2(t), I have
V1;2!1(x; t) · V1;2(x; t)
= xi ¡ Ii;
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where the last inequality implies x 2 Si1;2!1(t). Similarly, by the inequalities with respect
to the value functions, I can show that S11;2!1(t) ½ S11(t) and S21;2!2(t) ½ S22!;(t). ¤
Proposition 1 extends previous ¯ndings by (Geltner, Riddiough, and Stojanovic 1996,
Broadie and Detemple 1997, Detemple 2006) to a case in which the investment oppor-
tunity may be killed. The properties for the max-option in Section 2.2 remain true for
the generalized case. The monotonicity of Si1;2!1(t) implies that an increase (decrease)
in the value of project i (j 6= i) encourages investment in project i. The behavior on
the indi®erence line means that a ¯rm will wait and see which project is better when the
values of both projects are equal. Clearly, V1;2!1(x; t) (Si1;2!1(t)) monotonically decreases
(increases) with the intensity ¸. This means that an increased possibility of the disap-
pearance reduces the value of waiting and encourages investment. Note that V1;2!1(x; t) #
maxfx2¡I2; V1(x1; t)g; S11;2!1(t) " S11(t)nfx 2 R2++ j x2¡I2 ¸ V1(x1; t)g; S21;2!1(t) " fx 2
R2++ j x2 ¡ I2 > V1(x1; t)g (¸ " 1) and V1;2!1(x; t) " V1;2(x; t); Si1;2!1(t) # Si1;2(t) (¸ # 0).
A higher volatility ¾i increases V1;2(x; t) and V1(x1; t), and hence, it increases (de-
creases) V1;2!1(X(t); t) (S1;2!1(t)). On the other hand, an increase in the correlation co-
e±cient ½ tends to decrease (increase) V1;2!1(X(t); t) (S1;2!1(t)). This is because V1;2(x; t)
tends to increase with ½ (see (Geltner, Riddiough, and Stojanovic 1996, Detemple 2006)).
Note that the option value jumps downward from V1;2!1(X(t); t) to V1(X1(t); t) at the
time of the Poisson death (see Figure 1). The jump size is endogenously determined
as V1;2!1(X(t); t) ¡ V1(X1(t); t).7 The jump size decreases with ¸ and ½. Typically,
V1(X1(t); t) is more volatile than V1;2!1(X(t); t) in which X1(t) and X2(t) diversify the
risk. Accordingly, the volatility of the option value jumps upward on the same timing.
This may account for empirical observations (e.g., (Black 1976, Christie 1982)) that the
volatility of a stock price increases when the stock price decreases.
3.2 Option that will change to the max-option
This subsection considers an option that may change to the max-option. This option
contrasts with the option studied in Section 3.1. Assume that the investment opportunity
for project 2 is created at an instantaneous rate ¸dt which is independent of X(t). For
X(t) = x, the option value prior to the Poisson arrival is equal to the value function of
the optimal stopping problem as follows:
V1!1;2(x; t) := sup
¿2Tt
Ext [
Z 1
0
1f¿·Tgf1f¿<t+yge¡r(¿¡t)(X1(¿)¡ I1)
+1f¿¸t+yge¡ryV1;2(X(t+ y); t+ y)g¸e¡¸ydy] (20)
where y denotes the term until the arrival. The subscript 1 ! 1; 2 denotes the option
that may change to the max-option. Note that V1!1;2(x; t), unlike V1(x1; t), depends not
7In contrast, in a model based on the discontinuous stochastic process the jump size must be exogenously
presumed.
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Figure 1: The downward jump caused by the disappearance of the alternative.
only x1 but also x2 because of the potential arrival of project 2.
Using the similar calculation to (5), I can rewrite problem (20) as
V1!1;2(x; t) = sup
¿2Tt
Ext [1f¿·Tge¡(r+¸)(¿¡t)(X1(¿)¡ I1 ¡ V;!1;2(X(¿); ¿))] + V;!1;2(x; t);
(21)
where V;!1;2(x; t) is de¯ned by
V;!1;2(x; t) = Ext [
Z 1
0
e¡ryV1;2(X(t+ y); t+ y)¸e¡¸ydy]: (22)
The optimal stopping time for problem (21) becomes ¿1!1;2(t) := inffs ¸ t j X(s) 2
S11!1;2(s)g, where the stopping region S11!1;2(s) is de¯ned by
S11!1;2(s) := fx 2 R2++ j V1!1;2(x; s) = x1 ¡ I1g: (23)
Note that, the exercise region S11!1;2(s) exists only for project 1 although it also depends
on the value of project 2.
Proposition 2
(Convexity of the value function) V1!1;2(x; t) is convex with respect to x.
(Convexity of the stopping region) S11!1;2(t) is a convex set.
(Monotonicity of the stopping region) x 2 S11!1;2(t) ) x0 2 S11!1;2(t) (8x01 ¸
x1;8x02 · x2).
(Comparison) V1(x1; t) · V1!1;2(x; t) · V1;2(x; t) and S11;2(t) ½ S11!1;2(t) ½ S11(t).
Proof
10
(Convexity of the value function) Using the convexity of V1;2(x; t), I can construct
the same proof as the convexity of the value function in Proposition 1.
(Convexity of the stopping region) Using the convexity of V1!1;2(x; t), I can con-
struct the same proof as the convexity of the stopping region in Proposition 1.
(Monotonicity of the stopping region) Using
V1;2(x0; t) · V1;2(x; t) + x01 ¡ x1 (8x01 ¸ x1;8x02 · x2);
I can construct the same proof as the monotonicity of the stopping region in Proposition
1.
(Comparison) The relationships among the value functions are clear. Then, I can easily
show the relationships among the stopping regions. ¤
To my knowledge, there has been no studies that investigates the option that will
change to the max-option. Proposition 2 presents the ¯rst result for this type of option.
Propositions 1 and 2 bridge the gap between the standard option and the max-option
from both sides. The exercise region S11!1;2(t) has the same convexity and monotonicity
as S11;2(t) for the max-option. The monotonicity of S
1
1!1;2(t) implies that an increase (de-
crease) in the value of project 1 (2) accelerates investment in project 1. In the presence of
the potentially available project 2, a high value of project 2 increases the option value and
delay investment in project 1. It follows from expression (21) that S11!1;2(t) is contained
in fx 2 R++ j x1 ¸ I1 + V;!1;2(x; t)g. In particular, by
V;!1;2(x; t) ¸ Ext [
Z 1
0
e¡ry(X2(t+ y)¡ I2)¸e¡¸ydy]
=
¸x2
r + ¸¡ ¹ ¡
¸I2
r + ¸
;
I can show that x1 ¸ I1 + ¸x2=(r+ ¸¡ ¹)¡ ¸I2=(r+ ¸) for x 2 S11!1;2(t). This indicates
that for a high x2, S11!1;2(t) is much smaller than S11(t) = fx 2 R2++ j x1 ¸ x¤1(t)g.
Clearly, V1!1;2(x; t) (S1!1;2(t)) monotonically increases (decreases) with the intensity ¸.
This means that an increased possibility of the arrival enhances the value of waiting and
discourages investment. I have V1!1;2(x; t) " V1;2(x; t); S11!1;2(t) # S11;2(t) (¸ " 1) and
V1!1;2(x; t) # V1(x1; t); S11!1;2(t) " S11(t) (¸ # 0).
As in Section 3.1, V1!1;2(X(t); t) (S1!1;2(t)) increases (decreases) with the volatil-
ity ¾i and decreases (increases) with the correlation coe±cient ½. Note that the op-
tion value jumps upward from from V1!1;2(X(t); t) to V1;2(X(t); t) at the time of the
Poisson arrival (see Figure 2). The jump size, which is endogenously determined as
V1;2(X(t); t)¡ V1!1;2(X(t); t), decreases with ¸.
3.3 Extensions and limitations
This section explains several extensions of the results. First, consider the max option that
has n investment opportunities. Assume that projects n; n ¡ 1; : : : ;m + 1 will be killed
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Figure 2: The upward jump caused by the occurrence of the alternative.
sequentially with the intensity ¸. For X(t) = x, the option value prior to the Poisson
death is equal to the value function of the optimal stopping problem as follows:
V1;:::;n!1;:::;n¡1!¢¢¢!1;:::;m(x; t)
:= sup
¿2Tt
Ext [
Z 1
0
1f¿·Tgf1f¿<t+yge¡r(¿¡t) max
i=1;:::;n
fXi(¿)¡ Iig
+1f¿¸t+yge¡ryV1;:::;n¡1!1;:::;n¡2!¢¢¢!1;:::;m(X(t+ y); t+ y)g¸e¡¸ydy] (n > m);
which is de¯ned backward from
V1;:::;m!1;:::;m(x; t)
:= V1;:::;m(x; t)
:= sup
¿2Tt
Ext [1f¿·Tge¡r(¿¡t) max
i=1;:::;m
fXi(¿)¡ Iig]:
This is a generalized version of problem (10). Note that V1;:::;m(x; t) is convex with respect
to x. Then, using backward induction, I can show the same properties as Proposition 1.
Similarly, a generalized version of problem (20) is expressed as
V1;:::;m!1;:::;m+1!¢¢¢!1;:::;n(x; t)
:= sup
¿2Tt
Ext [
Z 1
0
1f¿·Tgf1f¿<t+yge¡r(¿¡t) max
i=1;:::;m
fXi(¿)¡ Iig
+1f¿¸t+yge¡ryV1;:::;m+1!¢¢¢!1;:::;n(X(t+ y); t+ y)g¸e¡¸ydy]:
I can show the same properties as Proposition 2 by the backward induction. Of course, it
does not matter if the intensities vary over projects. Furthermore, I can show the same
properties even if the order of the disappearances or occurrences is not presumable.
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For the problem in Section 3.2, a new valueX2(t) may be unobservable until the arrival.
For example, value of an alternative that proceeds from some technical innovation may
not be evaluated correctly prior to the innovation. This partial information problem is
essentially di®erent from problem (20) in that the option value and the investment strategy
depend only on X1(t).
4 Numerical Examples
This section provides numerical examples of the options studied in the previous section.
I use base parameter values as follows8:
r = 8%; ¹1 = ¹2 = 0%; ¾1 = ¾2 = 20%; ½ = 0%: (24)
For expositional purposes, I set the investment cost I1 = I2 = 100 and the option values
are computed at the money, i.e., x = (100; 100). The maturity of the option is set at
T ¡ t = 3 years. For the intensity ¸, the probability that an opportunity in which to
invest disappears or occurs within 3 years is expressed asZ 3
0
¸e¡¸tdt = 1¡ e¡3¸:
I set this probability at 25%; 50%, and 75%. These correspond to ¸ = 0:096; 0:231, and
0:462. In the numerical procedure, I make a discretization with 200 time steps per 1 year,
and use a bivariate version of the lattice binomial method (e.g., (Boyle 1988)). Technically,
I compute the lattice model for maturity T = 4 years, and draw the investment regions
for t = 1 year.
First, I set the intensity ¸ = 0:231. Figure 3 illustrates the exercise regions S1;2!1(t) =
S11;2!1(t) [ S21;2!1(t) and S11!1;2(t) for the base parameter values (24). For comparison,
the ¯gure also presents the exercise regions S1;2(t) = S11;2(t)[S21;2(t) and S11(t). I can check
the convexity and monotonicity of Si1;2!1(t) and S11!1;2(t), as well as the relationship that
S11;2(t) ½ S11;2!1(t) ½ S11(t); S21;2(t) ½ S21;2!1(t), and S11;2(t) ½ S11!1;2(t) ½ S11(t).
In Figure 3, let us take a look at the max-option that will change to the standard
option. When X(t) hits the boundary of S11;2!1(t) (the lower-right curve), a ¯rm invests
in project 1. On the contrary, when X(t) hits the boundary of S21;2!1(t) (the upper-left
curve), the ¯rm invests in project 2. The ¯rm delays the decision on project choice forX(t)
between the two curves, although project 2 may be killed in the waiting time. The ¯gure
indicates that the di®erence between S21;2!1(t) and S21;2(t) is greater than the di®erence
between S11;2!1(t) and S11;2(t). The prospective disappearance of project 2 encourages
investment in project 2 prior to the disappearance, while it does not have a signi¯cant
8These parameter values are similar to (Geltner, Riddiough, and Stojanovic 1996, Detemple 2006). I carried
out a lot of computations with varying parameter values and distilled robust results into this section.
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in°uence on the investment timing in project 1. The boundary of S21;2!1(t) approaches the
threshold x¤2(t) replaced r = 0:08 with r + ¸ = 0:08 + 0:231 = 0:311 when x1 ! 0. Then,
for x1 ¼ 0, S21;2!1(t) is much larger than S21;2(t). On the other hand, both boundaries of
S11;2(t) and S
1
1;2!1(t) converges to the threshold x¤1(t) when x2 ! 0. Then, for x2 ¼ 0,
S11;2!1(t) is almost the same as S11;2(t).
In Figure 3, let us now turn to the option that may change to the max-option. When
X(t) hits the boundary of S11!1;2(t) (the lower-right curve), a ¯rm invests in project
1. Otherwise, the ¯rm delays investment, and in the waiting time project 2 may become
available. I see that the gap between S11!1;2(t) and S11(t) increases with x2. This is because
a higher x2 increases an incentive for the ¯rm to wait for the occurrence of project 2. On
the other hand, for x2 ¼ 0 the boundary of S11!1;2(t) converges to the threshold x¤1(t),
and hence there is no gap between them.
Now, consider the comparative statics. First, I explore the e®ects of the intensity ¸.
Figures 4 and 5 draw the exercise regions S1;2!1(t) = S11;2!1(t)[ S21;2!1(t) and S11!1;2(t)
with varying levels of ¸. As mentioned in Section 3.2, Si1;2!1(t) increases with ¸, while
S11!1;2(t) decreases with ¸. For the max-option that may change to the standard option
for project 1, a higher ¸ increases an incentive for a ¯rm to invest in project 2 prior to the
disappearance. On the other hand, for the option that may change to the max-option, a
higher ¸ increases the value of waiting for project 2. Comparing Figures 4 and 5, I ¯nd
that the impact of ¸ on the exercise policy is stronger for the option that will change to the
max-option. This suggests that a ¯rm should take into careful consideration an alternative
which may be available in future rather than an alternative which may disappear in future.
Next, I explore the e®ects of the correlation coe±cient ½. Figures 6 and 7 illustrate
the exercise regions S1;2!1(t) = S11;2!1(t)[ S21;2!1(t) and S11!1;2(t) with varying levels of
½. In both ¯gures, the intensity ¸ is ¯xed at ¸ = 0:231. I see that Si1;2!1(t) and S11!1;2(t)
monotonically enlarge with ½. It is known (e.g., (Geltner, Riddiough, and Stojanovic
1996, Detemple 2006)) that Si1;2(t) tends to increase with ½ because a higher ½ decreases
the value of the option to delay the decision concerning project choice. Figures 6 and
7 demonstrate that the same result holds even if the disappearance or occurrence of an
alternative is taken into consideration. This means the robustness of the previous ¯ndings.
The e®ects of ½ also appear in Tables 1 and 2. The tables present the option values
V1;2!1(x; t) and V1!1;2(x; t) for varying levels of ¸ and ½. Note that V1;2!1(x; t) and
V1!1;2(x; t) are computed at the money, i.e., x = (100; 100). The option values monoton-
ically decrease with ½. The impact of ½ on V1;2!1(x; t) weakens with ¸, while the impact
of ½ on V1!1;2(x; t) strengthens with ¸. This can be explained as follows. When ¸!1,
V1;2!1(x; t) approaches V1(x; t) which is independent of ½. On the other hand, V1!1;2(x; t)
approaches V1(x; t) when ¸ ! 0. Then, a higher (lower) ¸ weakens the impact of ½ on
V1;2!1(x; t)(V1!1;2(x; t)). The impact of ¸ is signi¯cant to V1!1;2(x) especially for a low
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Table 1: The option values V1;2!1(x; t).
¸ n ½ ¡75% ¡50% ¡25% 0% 25% 50% 75%
0 22:8 22:1 21:28 20:32 19:2 17:82 15:98
0:096 21:07 20:46 19:75 18:93 17:97 16:8 15:26
0:231 19:36 18:83 18:23 17:55 16:75 15:79 14:53
0:462 17:5 17:07 16:59 16:04 15:42 14:68 13:73
Table 2: The option values V1!1;2(x; t).
¸ n ½ ¡75% ¡50% ¡25% 0% 25% 50% 75%
0 11:7 11:7 11:7 11:7 11:7 11:7 11:7
0:096 14:42 14:24 14:02 13:77 13:47 13:12 12:65
0:231 17:16 16:81 16:39 15:9 15:33 14:62 13:7
0:462 19:93 19:41 18:79 18:07 17:22 16:18 14:8
½. Indeed, for ½ = ¡50%, the Poisson arrival with the intensity ¸ = 0:096; 0:231, and
0:462 enhances the option value by 21%; 44%, and 66%, respectively. For ½ = 0% the
Poisson arrival with the intensity ¸ = 0:096; 0:231, and 0:462 increases the option value
by 18%; 36%, and 54%, respectively.
Let us examine Tables 1 and 2 from a di®erent aspect. As mentioned in Section 3.1
and 3.2 (see Figures 1 and 2), the gap between V1;2!1(x; t) and V1(x; t) = 11:7 is equal
to the jump size at the time of the Poisson death, while the gap between V1!1;2(x; t) and
V1;2(x; t) is equal to the jump size at the time of the Poisson arrival. Comparing Tables 1
and 2, I ¯nd that the downward jump size tends to be larger than the upward jump size.
This ¯nding may be related to empirical ¯ndings (e.g., (Skinner 1994)) that the stock
price response to bad news is larger than the stock price response to good news.
5 Conclusion
The paper has investigated the nature of two types of option; the max-option that will
change to the standard option by the Poisson death, and the option that will change to the
max-option by the Poisson arrival. These uncertain changes in real options can be caused
by changes in regulatory, political, competitive, and technological environment. The
model, unlike the previous studies, directly captures these catastrophic risks in capital
budgeting. In the model, I have revealed how the possibility of the disappearance or
occurrence in°uences the optimal exercise policy and the option value. The results are
summarized as follows.
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Figure 3: The exercise regions for the four options. This ¯gure plots the boundaries of the
exercise regions S1;2!1(t) = S11;2!1(t)[ S21;2!1(t), S11!1;2(t), S1;2(t) = S11;2(t)[ S21;2(t) and S11(t).
The parameter values are set at the base case (24) with the intensity ¸ = 0:231.
A higher intensity of the disappearance (occurrence) decreases (increases) the option
value and encourages (discourages) investment. The properties, such as the monotonicity
and convexity shown by the max-option literature, remain true when the random change
is taken into consideration. The impact of the uncertain change is relatively greater for
the option that may change to the max-option. Notably, the impact is signi¯cant for
a weaker or negative correlation between the project values. The results o®er rational
explanations for the behavior of an owner of farmland which has not been cultivated in
many years. The results have the potential to account for the asymmetric market reaction
to good and bad news, although the model is not intended to investigate the stock price
reactions.
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Figure 4: The exercise regions for the max-option that will change to the standard option.
This ¯gure plots the boundaries of the exercise regions S1;2!1(t) = S11;2!1(t)[ S21;2!1(t) for the
intensity ¸ = 0; 0:096; 0:231, and 0:462. For ¸ = 0, the region is equal to the exercise region for
the max-option, S1;2(t). The parameter values are set at the base case (24).
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Figure 5: The exercise regions for the option that will change to the max-option. This ¯gure
plots the boundaries of the exercise regions S11!1;2(t) for the intensity ¸ = 0; 0:096; 0:231, and
0:462. For ¸ = 0, the region is equal to the exercise region for the standard option, S11(t). The
parameter values are set at the base case (24).
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Figure 6: The exercise regions for the max-option that will change to the standard option.
This ¯gure plots the boundaries of the exercise regions S1;2!1(t) = S11;2!1(t)[ S21;2!1(t) for the
correlation coe±cient ½ = ¡75%;¡50%;¡25%; 0%; 25%; 50%, and 75%. The intensity is set at
¸ = 0:231. The other parameter values are set at the base case (24).
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Figure 7: The exercise regions for the option that will change to the max-option. This
¯gure plots the boundaries of the exercise regions S11!1;2(t) for the correlation coe±cient
½ = ¡75%;¡50%;¡25%; 0%; 25%; 50%, and 75%. The intensity is set at ¸ = 0:231. The
other parameter values are set at the base case (24).
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